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Possible reform of investor-State dispute settlement
(ISDS) — cost and duration

Note by the Secretariat

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I. Introduction

1. At its thirty-fifth session, the Working Group suggested that the Secretariat (i) prepare a list of the concerns about investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS) raised during its thirty-fourth and thirty-fifth sessions, (ii) set out a possible framework for its future deliberations, and (iii) consider the provision of further information to assist States with respect to the scope of some concerns (A/CN.9/935, para. 99).

2. Document A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.149 addresses items (i) and (ii). This Note considers the topic of cost and duration as a procedural aspect of ISDS and provides additional information on those topics. The Working Group had discussed those topics at its thirty-fourth session based on paragraphs 23 to 25 of document A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.142. In summary, the current ISDS practice has put into doubt the oft-quoted notion that arbitration represents a speedy and low-cost method for resolving investor-State disputes with average costs exceeding $8 million per party and duration averaging between three to four years (A/CN.9/930/Rev.1, para. 36). Accordingly, concerns were expressed regarding increasingly high costs and lengthy proceedings.

3. As is the case for other documents provided to the Working Group, this Note was prepared with reference to a broad range of published information on the topic, and does not seek to express a view on the desirability of reforms, which is a matter for the Working Group to consider.

II. Procedural efficiency of ISDS: cost and duration

A. General

Prevention of investor-States disputes

4. Before addressing the cost and duration of investor-State disputes, it should be understood that any dispute between a State and an investor is a burden on both parties. A dispute or even the possibility of a dispute could increase transactional costs of investors, which may result in loss of business opportunities. A dispute may entail economic and social costs for States, including a negative impact on its foreign investment inflow. Disputes generally result in the severance of the link between foreign investors and host States, which is counterproductive for both parties. Therefore, efforts are made by both investors and States to prevent disputes through various measures and to resolve them effectively, investor-State arbitration being a last resort recourse. There have been increasing efforts to highlight the importance of dispute prevention and of forms of dispute settlement other than arbitration (A/CN.9/930/Rev.1, para. 52). At the thirty-fourth session, it was suggested that a model could be designed to relate duration and the level of costs to the benefits of investment to the investors, as a practical tool to prevent such disputes (A/CN.9/930/Rev.1, para. 39). It was also suggested that assistance could be provided to developing States to advise them through the ISDS process. While these are important aspects to bear in mind when assessing the need for and the forms reform could take, this Note focuses more on concerns expressed with regard to the cost and duration of investor-State arbitration.

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3 See for example, UNCTAD, UNCTAD Series on International Investment Policies for Development. "Investor-State Disputes: Prevention and Alternatives to Arbitration" (2010) available at http://unctad.org/en/docs/diaea200911_en.pdf. In light of the perceived disadvantages of investment arbitration, the paper addresses the possibility of resolving disputes through negotiation, conciliation or mediation and dispute prevention policies that attempt to prevent disputes from emerging or escalating to formal investment disputes.
5. Damages awarded by ISDS tribunals against States have increased over the years with the average amount awarded to successful claimants reaching $110.9 million.\(^4\) Compared to the mean and median amounts awarded prior to 2013 (respectively $76.3 million and $10.7 million), those awarded since 2013 have increased to $171 million and $40 million. This illustrates a 124 per cent increase in the mean amount awarded and 274 per cent increase in the median amount.\(^5\) Such amounts, perceived as being excessive, have been the subject of growing concern as they have significant impact on States, particularly those with limited financial resources. However, the focus of this Note is on costs related to rendering of an award (thus the procedural aspect). In other words, this Note will concentrate more on the financial burden on investors and States in participating in ISDS proceedings.

B. Concerns identified by the Working Group

6. The Working Group undertook a preliminary discussion on costs and duration of ISDS at its thirty-fourth session under the general topic of procedural aspects of the arbitral process (A/CN.9/930/Rev.1, paras. 35–78). States and intergovernmental organizations shared their experiences in connection with ISDS. The following is a summary of the concerns expressed during the session.

Financial burden on the parties

7. It was widely felt that lengthy and costly ISDS proceedings raised concerns and practical challenges to respondent States as well as to claimant investors. Highlighting the resource-intensive nature of the proceedings, it was mentioned that the inclusion of ISDS provisions in investment treaties could have financial implications (A/CN.9/930/Rev.1, para. 37).

8. Particular attention was drawn to the fact that the high cost of ISDS paid with public funds was difficult to justify for developing States, whose financial and human resources were scarce and may pose a disproportionately heavy burden on smaller States. Certain States may struggle to meet the significant resources required for defending an ISDS claim and they may be faced with criticism for the use of public funds. In that context, it was noted that the cost of ISDS could compete with urgent developmental needs of those States (A/CN.9/930/Rev.1, para. 40).

9. It was also noted that the financial burden was not only on respondent States, but also on claimant investors, particularly small and medium-sized enterprises. Increasing cost of ISDS proceedings may limit the access of such enterprises to ISDS mechanisms or deter their use,\(^6\) thus depriving them of the protection provided to them under investment treaties. The Working Group noted that the cost of ISDS had risen to a level where it could be perceived as imposing a barrier to accessing the system to certain investors with limited financial resources (A/CN.9/930/Rev.1, paras. 41 and 64).

\(^4\) See Matthew Hodgson and Alastair Campbell, Damages and costs in investment treaty arbitration revisited, Global Arbitration Review (14 December 2017) available at http://www.allenovery.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/14-12-17_Damages_and_costs_in_investment_treaty_arbitration_revisited_.pdf (the “2017 MH Study”). The figure is based on 132 awards excluding the Yukos case, where more than $50 billion was awarded.

\(^5\) Ibid.

\(^6\) See, for example, paragraph 6 of article 8.39 of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between the European Union and Canada (CETA), which states as follows: “The CETA Joint Committee shall consider supplemental rules aimed at reducing the financial burden on claimants who are natural persons or small and medium-sized enterprises. Such supplemental rules may, in particular, take into account the financial resources of such claimants and the amount of compensation sought.”
Possible approaches to cost and duration

10. It was generally felt that deliberations relating to cost and duration should be fact-based, yet also noting that perceptions on those issues had formed the basis of criticisms on the legitimacy of the ISDS system (A/CN.9/930/Rev.1, paras. 42, 62 and 63). Section D of this Note summarizes existing data to facilitate a fact-based analysis by the Working Group.

11. It was emphasized that cost and duration of ISDS proceedings should not be examined in isolation, but by reference to suitable comparators, which might include other international dispute settlement bodies such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of the World Trade Organization (WTO), and domestic court procedures (A/CN.9/930/Rev.1, paras. 43 and 62). Section D.5 addresses these comparators.

12. It was also emphasized that notions of cost and duration were relative in nature, and whether the process was excessively costly or lengthy should be determined on a case-by-case basis and taking into account the need for effective administration of justice. Therefore, it was highlighted that it would be important to draw a distinction between “excessive” or “unjustified” time and cost on the one hand, and “necessary” or “justified” time and cost on the other. In that regard, it was noted that the quality of outcomes should be balanced with the desire to reduce cost and duration (A/CN.9/930/Rev.1, paras. 42, 62, 71 and 72).

Possible reasons for increases in cost and duration

13. The Working Group also identified some of the reasons contributing to excessive cost and lengthy duration, which are summarized in section E.1 below (A/CN.9/930/Rev.1, paras. 44-48, 65). Particular attention was drawn to the lack of predictability as a cause for increased cost and duration (A/CN.9/930/Rev.1, para. 44), which is addressed in document A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.150.

Other related concerns

14. The Working Group also identified allocation of costs by arbitral tribunals in ISDS as a concern that merited further consideration and that it might wish to take note of an emerging approach based on proportional allocation of costs (A/CN.9/930/Rev.1, paras. 53–55 and 66–67). This is dealt with in sections C.2 and D.4.

15. A further area of concern related to difficulties faced by successful States being unable to recover some or all of its costs from claimant investors and the need for rules on security of costs (A/CN.9/930/Rev.1, paras. 56, 66 and 68). This is dealt with in more detail in section C.3.

16. Concerns were expressed also with respect to third-party funding and other forms of external financing, which were available to investors and not to States, thus creating a structural imbalance between investors and States (A/CN.9/930/Rev.1, paras. 57, 64 and 69). Issues pertaining to third-party funding as well as their impact on other issues, such as conflicts of interest for arbitrators, collection and enforcement of costs awards will be addressed in due course in a separate Note by the Secretariat.

C. Analysis of cost and duration

1. Elements of cost and duration as well as their interrelationship

Elements of cost

17. There are various elements of cost that need to be borne by the parties when they engage in ISDS proceedings. They make up the funding required by claimant investors to bring their claims and for respondent States to respond to such claims until the final award is rendered.
18. Such costs include, among others, tribunal costs (for example, fees of arbitrators and their expenses, tribunal secretaries), administrative costs (for example, fees charged by arbitral institutions) and party costs (for example, fees paid by the parties to its counsel for legal representation and for experts).

19. The Working Group has taken note of the analyses suggesting that 80 to 90 per cent of costs in ISDS were associated with party costs (A/CN.9/930/Rev.1, para. 36). According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), party costs were estimated to average about 82 per cent of the total costs. According to the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), in large investment cases, counsel and expert fees may account for approximately 90 per cent of the overall cost.

20. As will be illustrated in section D.2, the average sum of tribunal and administrative costs for investment disputes was $933,000. The mean party costs for claimant investors was $6,019,000 with the median being $3,375,000. The mean party costs for respondent States was $4,855,000 with the median being $2,793,000.

21. There may be additional elements of cost, for example, costs related to the collection as well as enforcement or setting aside of awards in domestic courts as well as annulment through the ICSID proceedings.

Elements of duration

22. There exist different stages of investment dispute resolution. The pre-arbitration stage is when efforts are made by the parties to reach an amicable resolution of the dispute. This stage may involve alternative dispute resolution mechanisms other than arbitration and may also include the period where the potential claimant investor prepares its claims. Investment treaties typically feature cooling off or waiting periods whereby parties seeking to initiate arbitration proceedings are required to hold off for a specified period, during which an amicable settlement should be attempted.

23. The arbitration proceeding is usually deemed to commence when the notice/request of arbitration is received by the respondent State. In ICSID proceedings, a case is only initiated after it has been screened and registered. The composition of the arbitral tribunal would generally follow, where arbitrators are appointed by the parties or the appointing authority and where challenges may be made with regard to the arbitrators. Once the tribunal is composed, the arbitral proceedings will begin and the tribunal will usually have the flexibility to conduct the proceedings in such manner as it considers appropriate. This stage would involve submission of statements of claims and defence, other written statements, request for interim measures, submission of evidence, hearings and reports by expert witnesses. They may be both written and oral. Assistance may be sought from courts in taking of evidence. The hearings will then be declared closed upon which the tribunal would prepare and render an award.

24. Once an award is rendered, parties may apply for corrections (revisions) or interpretation of the award to the tribunal. Parties may also apply to set aside the award in a domestic court or to annul the award under ICSID proceedings. The enforcement of the award would generally constitute the final stage of ISDS. As there is no operational mechanism in place to appeal ISDS awards, this Note does not take that aspect into account.

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9. Hodgson & Campbell, supra note 4. The study analysed the data pool of 324 awards.

25. The Working Group noted and concerns were expressed that the three most time-intensive stages were (i) the appointment/composition of the tribunal, (ii) disclosure, discovery or document production and (iii) the issuance of the award (the period between the final hearing and the rendering of the award including deliberations when drafting the award) (A/CN.9/930/Rev.1, paras. 48 and 65). An additional stage is when enforcement takes place, which was reported in some cases to have exceeded the original arbitration proceedings in length (A/CN.9/930/Rev.1, para. 48).

26. As concerns in the Working Group have mostly been expressed with regard to arbitral proceedings (from notice of arbitration to rendering of the award), this Note also focuses on that stage. As will be illustrated in section D.3, the average duration of ISDS proceedings (from request/notice of arbitration to final award) is 3 to 4 years.

Correlation between cost and duration

27. With regard to the correlation between cost and duration of ISDS proceedings, there was a shared understanding in the Working Group that both were interlinked, as lengthy proceedings were likely to result in higher costs (A/CN.9/930/Rev.1, para. 38). However, there is insufficient empirical evidence indicating that increase in costs necessarily results in longer duration of the proceedings.

2. Allocation of costs: approaches and rules

28. At the thirty-fourth session, it was highlighted that allocation of costs by arbitral tribunals in ISDS warranted detailed consideration (A/CN.9/930/Rev.1, paras. 53 and 66).

29. There are different ways in which costs may be apportioned between the parties in ISDS. First, the “pay your own way” approach suggests that each party should bear its own costs and that tribunal and administrative costs should be split equally between the parties. Second, the “costs follow the event” approach suggests that a successful party should ordinarily recover its reasonable costs. Third, the “relative success” approach suggests that tribunals should seek to apportion/adjust costs based on parties’ relative success on different issues raised during the proceedings. This approach can be viewed as a more detailed application of the “costs follow the event” approach as the cost award would reflect the relative success of the winning party in terms of the proportion of successful limbs of its claims (A/CN.9/930/Rev.1, para. 55).

30. Article 40(1) of the 1976 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules includes elements of the “costs follow the event” approach, in providing that costs of arbitration (as defined in article 38) are to be borne “in principle” by the unsuccessful party. With regard to party costs, article 40(2) provided that the arbitral tribunal, taking into account the circumstances of the case, shall be free to determine which party shall bear such costs or may apportion such costs between the parties if it determines that apportionment is reasonable. The 2010 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules no longer...
distinguishes party costs from the costs of arbitration and provides, in article 42, that the costs of the arbitration shall be in principle borne by the unsuccessful party.13

31. The ICSID Convention gives tribunals a broad discretion in deciding how costs should be apportioned between the parties, and does not provide guidance as to which of the above-mentioned approaches should be followed and in what circumstances.14 Rule 28 of the ICSID Arbitration Rules provides guidance on the cost of proceedings.15

32. Different approaches may be witnessed in applicable investment treaties, which would generally override the cost provisions of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules or the ICSID Convention. Some recent investment treaties, including the CETA16 and the EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement,17 have adopted the “costs follow the event” as the default approach to cost allocation.

13 Article 42 of the 2010 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules reads:
   “1. The costs of the arbitration shall in principle be borne by the unsuccessful party or parties. However, the arbitral tribunal may apportion each of such costs between the parties if it determines that apportionment is reasonable, taking into account the circumstances of the case.”
   Article 40 defines costs as follows:
   “2. The term ‘costs’ includes only:
   (a) The fees of the arbitral tribunal to be stated separately as to each arbitrator and to be fixed by the tribunal itself in accordance with article 41;
   (b) The reasonable travel and other expenses incurred by the arbitrators;
   (c) The reasonable costs of expert advice and of other assistance required by the arbitral tribunal;
   (d) The reasonable travel and other expenses of witnesses to the extent such expenses are approved by the arbitral tribunal;
   (e) The legal and other costs incurred by the parties in relation to the arbitration to the extent that the arbitral tribunal determines that the amount of such costs is reasonable;
   (f) Any fees and expenses of the appointing authority as well as the fees and expenses of the Secretary-General of the PCA.”

14 Article 61 of the ICSID Convention reads:
   “(1) …
   (2) In the case of arbitration proceedings the Tribunal shall, except as the parties otherwise agree, assess the expenses incurred by the parties in connection with the proceedings, and shall decide how and by whom those expenses, the fees and expenses of the members of the Tribunal and the charges for the use of the facilities of the Centre shall be paid. Such decision shall form part of the award.”

   The proposed revisions to the ICSID Rules indicate that in allocating costs, tribunals should consider specific factors, such as outcome, the parties’ conduct, the complexity of the issues; and the reasonableness of the costs claimed. See supra note 11, para. 223.

15 Rule 28 of the ICSID Arbitration Rules (Cost of Proceeding) reads:
   “(1) Without prejudice to the final decision on the payment of the cost of the proceeding, the Tribunal may, unless otherwise agreed by the parties, decide:
   (a) At any stage of the proceeding, the portion which each party shall pay, pursuant to Administrative and Financial Regulation 14, of the fees and expenses of the Tribunal and the charges for the use of the facilities of the Centre;
   (b) With respect to any part of the proceeding, that the related costs (as determined by the Secretary-General) shall be borne entirely or in a particular share by one of the parties.
   (2) Promptly after the closure of the proceeding, each party shall submit to the Tribunal a statement of costs reasonably incurred or borne by it in the proceeding and the Secretary-General shall submit to the Tribunal an account of all amounts paid by each party to the Centre and of all costs incurred by the Centre for the proceeding. The Tribunal may, before the award has been rendered, request the parties and the Secretary-General to provide additional information concerning the cost of the proceeding.”

16 Paragraph 5 of article 8.39 of CETA reads:
   “The Tribunal shall order that the costs of the proceedings be borne by the unsuccessful disputing party. In exceptional circumstances, the Tribunal may apportion costs between the disputing parties if it determines that apportionment is appropriate in the circumstances of the claim. Other reasonable costs, including costs of legal representation and assistance, shall be borne by the unsuccessful disputing party, unless the Tribunal determines that such apportionment is unreasonable in the circumstances of the claim. If only parts of the claims have been successful the costs shall be adjusted, proportionately, to the number or extent of the successful parts of the claims.”

17 Article 3.21 of the EU-Singapore Investment Protection Agreement.
3. Security for costs

33. At the thirty-fourth session, it was pointed out that the respondent State might find itself not able to recover a substantial part or any of its costs in defending an unsuccessful, frivolous or bad faith claim by investors. Furthermore, investors might use shell companies, or be impecunious, making recovery impossible (A/CN.9/930/Rev.1, paras. 53 and 56). Accordingly, the Working Group identified difficulties faced by successful respondent States in recovering costs from claimant investors as another area of concern. That issue was highlighted as exemplifying an imbalance between parties, because States, given their permanence, were in a different position from investors, who might be unwilling or unable to pay (A/CN.9/930/Rev.1, paras. 56 and 68). It was further mentioned that the situation was aggravated by the fact that the possibility of obtaining security for costs was not provided for under investment treaties and in certain arbitration rules.

34. Article 26(2)(c) of the 2010 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules provides that the arbitral tribunal may, at the request of a party, grant interim measures, which may include an order for a party to provide a means of preserving assets out of which a subsequent award may be satisfied. Article 42(2) states that the arbitral tribunal shall in the final award or, if it deems appropriate, in any other award, determine any amount that a party may have to pay to another party as a result of the decision on allocation of costs. In combination, arbitral tribunals generally have the power to grant security for costs under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.

35. Article 47 of the ICSID Convention provides that, except as the parties otherwise agree, a tribunal may, if it considers that the circumstances so require, recommend any provisional measures which should be taken to preserve the respective rights of either party. This provides a basis for respondent States to request security for costs as a provisional matter when a claimant investor brings a clearly dubious claim or is unwilling or unable to cover the respondent State’s costs.

36. In a decision of 13 August 2014, an ICSID tribunal rendered by majority an order on security for costs. Furthermore, the arbitral tribunal sanctioned the claimant’s failure to comply with the order on security for costs. While the circumstances of the case may have been exceptional, it provides an example of security for costs being awarded in an investment arbitration.

37. Considering that security for costs in ISDS proceedings have been rare compared to commercial arbitration, the Working Group may wish to discuss policy and practical considerations on whether and under what circumstances ISDS tribunals should be allowed to order security for costs. The Working Group may also wish to discuss the topic based on the working paper to be prepared on third-party funding.

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18 See also Rule 39 of the ICSID Arbitration Rules on provisional measures. A party may seek provisional measures at any time after proceedings have been instituted.
19 RSM Production Corporation v. Saint Lucia, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/10, Decision on Saint Lucia’s Request for Security for Costs (13 August 2014) available at https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw3318.pdf. This is the first publicly reported cases in which a security for cost was granted by an ICSID tribunal.
21 Supra note 19, para. 86. The majority of the tribunal distinguished the exceptional circumstances in this case from all the previous cases, recording that the difference between the present proceeding and previous ISDS arbitrations in which the request for security for costs was in every case denied, is that in this case the circumstances which were brought forward in other proceedings occur cumulatively.
D. Data on cost and duration of ISDS

1. Lack of comprehensive and consolidated information

38. While the need for deliberations relating to cost and duration to be fact-based was constantly highlighted by the Working Group, there is, at present, no comprehensive database that contains consolidated information about cost and duration of ISDS cases. Moreover, final awards that typically contain statements of cost are not always publicly available. Furthermore, as had been evidenced, an individual case involving a large claim may distort relevant data on average cost and duration of ISDS. ICSID publishes statistical information about its cases and information relating to duration of each individual case can be obtained however not in a consolidated manner.

39. Difficulty in presenting relevant data is illustrated in the study by Jeffery Commission (the “JC Study”). Of the 138 ICSID arbitrations (2011–2015) surveyed, data on costs was not publicly available for the 45 proceedings that were discontinued or settled. As for the remaining 93 arbitrations that were decided by a tribunal, data on costs was not necessarily available for the following reasons: (i) the award itself was not yet publicly available; (ii) the award was publicly available but costs data was not included in any form; or (c) some but not all costs data was included in the award. As a result, data on costs was available for claimant investors in 55 arbitrations and respondent States in 56 arbitrations. Details on tribunal costs were available in 40 awards.

40. In considering the data on duration of the proceedings, the fact that a number of disputes are discontinued/settled poses difficulties in capturing the average duration of ISDS proceedings per se. The Working Group may wish to exercise caution in comparative analyses, given the multiple factors that can differentiate one proceeding from another. These may include: (i) the complexity of a particular case; (ii) changes in the composition of counsel or the tribunal (including through challenges); (iii) the use of certain procedural mechanisms (such as bifurcation and amicus curiae applications); (iv) translation of documents and the award; (v) the emergence of post-hearing evidentiary or legal issues and (vi) dissenting opinion to the final award.

41. In this context, this Note sets out empirical data that is publicly available but not comprehensive, as illustrated in a limited number of studies on the topic. The Working Group may wish to take into account the above-mentioned limitations when analysing the information below.

2. Existing data on costs

42. In 2012, OECD concluded that legal and arbitration costs for claimants and respondents combined in recent ISDS cases averaged about $8 million and could exceed $30 million per case. This figure has been quoted in a number of subsequent documents.

Tribunal costs

43. The 2017 MH Study indicates that the mean tribunal costs increased from 746,000 USD (median $590,000) at the end of 2012 to $1,118,000 (median $905,000),


23 OECD, supra note 7. The OECD Secretariat surveyed 143 publicly available ISDS arbitration awards as of August 2011 with 28 award providing information about tribunal and party costs. Eighty-one awards provided some information about costs while 62 provided none.

considering 89 cases from 2013 onwards.\(^{25}\) This indicates a 50 per cent increase in both mean and median tribunal costs.

44. The JC Study reveals that the mean ICSID tribunal costs was 883,000 USD (median $875,900), considering 40 cases from 2011 to 2015.\(^{26}\) The 2014 MH Study estimated ICSID tribunal costs at $769,000 and the 2017 MH Study at $1,042,000.

45. The JC Study also reveals that the tribunal costs in majority of the UNCITRAL arbitrations were $1 million or less.\(^{27}\) The 2014 MH Study estimated UNCITRAL tribunal costs at $853,000 and the 2017 MH Study at $1,384,000.\(^{28}\)

46. The 2017 MH Study suggests that while disparity between ICSID and UNCITRAL tribunals may have grown when comparing mean tribunal costs, median costs are rather closely aligned between ICSID ($910,000) and UNCITRAL ($905,000) tribunal costs.

47. In 2011, the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC) reported that the average sum of tribunal and administrative cost of SCC’s investment cases was €290,936.\(^{29}\)

### Party costs

48. The 2014 MH Study indicated that the average party costs were $4,437,000 for claimant investors and $4,559,000 for respondent States.\(^{30}\) The median amount was 3,145,000 USD for claimants and 2,286,000 for respondents. In most cases, claimants incurred considerably greater costs than respondents, which may be the consequence of the claimants bearing the burden of proof and the tendency for many States to run cost-driven tender processes.

49. With respect to ICSID arbitration, the JC study reveals that cost incurred by claimant investors was on average $5.6 million and for respondent States $4.9 million.\(^{31}\) The median figures for claimant and respondent costs were significantly lower: $2.9 million for claimants, and $3.7 million for respondents. In 64 per cent of the arbitrations, claimant costs were below $5 million. In 68 per cent of the arbitrations, respondent costs were below $5 million.

50. With respect to UNCITRAL arbitration, the JC Study shows that cost incurred by claimants was on average $7.3 million and for respondents $4.71 million. In 80 per cent of the arbitrations, claimant costs were below $5 million. In 73 per cent of the arbitrations, respondent costs were below $5 million.

51. The 2017 MH Study illustrate an increase in party costs in comparison to the 2014 Study. The average party costs were $7.4 million for claimants (68 per cent increase) and $5.2 million for respondents (13 per cent increase).\(^{32}\) The median

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\(^{25}\) Hodgson & Campbell, supra note 4. See also Matthew Hodgson, Counting the costs of investment treaty arbitration, Global Arbitration Review (24 March 2014) available at http://www.allenovery.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/Counting_the_costs_of_investment_treaty.pdf (the “2014 MH Study”). The 2017 MH study analyses the data pool of 324 awards and 52 decisions on annulment. The 2014 MH Study reviewed 176 cases in which an award or decision was publicly available as of 31 December 2012. The 2017 MH Study reviewed 140 cases which were publicly made available from 31 December 2012 to 31 May 2017.

\(^{26}\) Jeffery Commission, supra note 22. The Study notes that in the 27 of the 40 ICSID cases, tribunal costs were $1 million or less.

\(^{27}\) Twenty-two out of 40 awards rendered between 2010 and 2015, of which 28 included details on tribunal costs.

\(^{28}\) However, considering that the tribunal costs in Yukos were $11.4 million and, if that figure is excluded from the 2017 Study data pool, mean UNCITRAL tribunal costs is just over $1 million.


\(^{30}\) Out of the 176 cases reviewed, data on costs were available in 73 and 66 cases respectively for claimants and respondents.

\(^{31}\) This takes into account 55 and 56 ICSID arbitrations between 2011–2015 where information on costs was available respectively for claimants and respondents.

\(^{32}\) The Working Group should note that the average figures may have been distorted by the Yukos cases, where the claimants’ party costs were reported to be $81.4 million and the respondent’s party costs being $31.5 million.
amount was $4.2 million for claimants (34 per cent increase) and $3.4 million for respondents (48 per cent increase). The 2017 MH Study concludes that the average party costs of all existing cases (based on 177 cases for claimants and 169 cases for respondents) stand at $6 million for claimants and $4.9 million for respondents.

Significant proportion of party costs

52. The data confirms the understanding of the Working Group that party costs account for a significant portion of overall costs (see para. 0 above). According to the 2017 MH Study, the sum of average party costs ($10.9 million) is approximately 9.85 times greater than the average tribunal cost ($1.1 million).

Sample cases

53. The following provides some example cost figures provided by PCA on ISDS cases it administered. For example, the amount in dispute in *Chemtura Corporation v. Canada* (2010) was approximately $79 million. The overall cost of the proceedings was $7.5 million, which was composed of tribunal costs (9.1 per cent), administrative costs (0.03 per cent), claimants costs (17.17 per cent) and respondent’s costs (73.7 per cent). In *Dunkeld International Investment Ltd v. Belize* (2016), the amount in dispute was approximately $175 million with the overall cost at $6.1 million. Claimant’s costs composed 70.18 per cent of the total costs with respondent’s cost also composing 19.73 per cent. In *Almas v. Poland*, the amount in dispute was $3 million. The overall cost was $1.08 million, with tribunals costs reaching 19.18 per cent, claimant costs 60.11 per cent and respondents costs 17.59 per cent of the overall cost. These examples also illustrate that depending on the circumstances of the case, elements of costs could vary to a certain extent.

3. Existing data on duration

54. In 2009, it was reported that the average duration of ICSID arbitrations was 3.63 years (1,325 days) from filing of the request for arbitration to the date of the final award. It was also reported that the average time between a hearing on the merits and an award was 425 days.

55. ICSID has published the average duration of arbitrations in its annual reports. In 2011, it was reported that the average duration of arbitration proceedings concluded in the course of the 2010 and 2011 fiscal year (from 1 July to 30 June), calculated from registration of the request for arbitration to conclusion of the proceeding, was 43 months in 2010 and 31 months in 2011. The average duration of proceedings calculated from the tribunal constitution to the conclusion of proceedings was 37 months in 2010 and 25 months in 2011. It was further reported that the majority of arbitrations concluded in 2012 and in 2013 lasted between three to four years from the date of the tribunal’s constitution. Those concluded in 2014 lasted on average just over three and a half years. That figure slightly increased to 39 months in 2015. More recently, ICSID reported that the average length of the cases from 2015 to 2017 was 3 years and 7 months from the tribunal constitution to an award. When broken down by the type of proceeding, the average length was: (i) 13 years 9 months

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33 Pulkowski, supra note 8.
34 Case details are available at https://pca-cpa.org/en/cases/66/.
35 Case details are available at https://pca-cpa.org/en/cases/23/.
36 Case details are available at https://pca-cpa.org/en/cases/118/.
37 Anthony Clair, “ICSID arbitration: How long does it take?”, Global Arbitration Review (27 October 2009). The article was based on a review of the 115 ICSID cases resulting in an award from the creation of ICSID until 1 July 2009.
39 Ibid.
43 ICSID, supra note 11, Schedule 9, para. 3. The ICSID Secretariat reviewed 63 cases which concluded with an award in the period 1 January 2015 to 30 June 2017.
for a joint proceeding; (ii) 3 years 6 months for a bifurcated proceeding; and (iii) 829 days for the merits only proceeding.\(^{44}\)

56. The JC Study indicates that the average duration of ICSID proceedings, from registration to award, was 3.75 years, or 1,370 days (median 1,266 days).\(^{45}\) Its reviews of 60 UNCITRAL proceedings resulting in an award from 1990 to 2015 reveals that the average duration from notice of arbitration to award was 3.96 years, or 1,446 days (median 1,246 days).\(^{46}\) In 2011, SCC reported that the average length of an investment case under the SCC rules was 21 months from date of registration to final award.\(^{47}\)

**Time to award**

57. The JC Study also reviewed the duration taken to issue arbitral awards after the final hearing. It notes that the average period was 379 days for both UNCITRAL and ICSID proceedings.\(^{48}\) The median for UNCITRAL proceedings was 329 days and for ICSID proceedings was 330 days. Approximately 56 per cent of UNCITRAL and ICSID tribunals took less than a year to render an award after the final hearing.

**Post-award remedies**

58. A study of the 45 decisions on annulment of ICSID awards rendered till December 2015 indicates that the average amount of time between registration of a request for annulment and the issuance of a decision on annulment was 730 days (median 720 days) with 80 per cent of the decisions on annulment rendered within one year of the hearing. The average time required to render a decision after the final hearing was 269 days. The fact that some annulment proceedings are rejected or discontinued should be taken into account in reviewing such data.

59. The Working Group may wish to take note that other post-award requests also include requests for the tribunal to correct, interpret or supplement the awards. In addition, non-ICSID awards may involve setting aside or recognition/enforcement proceedings in domestic courts. Unlike the ICSID annulment proceedings, it is difficult to compile information on cost and duration of such post-award remedies due to the limited number of publicly available information and due to the differences that exist in the jurisdictions.\(^{49}\)

### 4. Existing data on cost allocation

60. As described in section C.2, there are different approaches to allocating costs between the parties. At the thirty-fourth session of the Working Group, it was stated that in the absence of allocation of costs, there would be no incentive for the parties to limit their arguments and submissions (A/CN.9/930/Rev.1, para. 53). It was further

\(^{44}\) Ibid., para. 9. See also table provided in Section II.

\(^{45}\) Commission, supra note 22.

\(^{46}\) Ibid.

\(^{47}\) SCC, supra note 29. It further notes that factors that affect the length of the proceedings include bifurcation of the proceedings and interim or partial awards.

\(^{48}\) Commission, supra note 22. The study reviews 222 ICSID and 59 UNCITRAL proceedings.

\(^{49}\) Where a final hearing was not held, the date of the final written submission (excluding those on costs) was used as the basis.

The following are some recent examples: (i) The *Energoaliants SARL v. the Republic of Moldova* award of 23 October 2013 was set aside by the Paris Court of Appeal on 12 April 2016 but was reinstated by the French Court of Cassation on 28 March 2018 and remanded to the Court of Appeal; (ii) The awards in the Yukos case of 18 July 2014 were set aside by the Hague District Court on 20 April 2016 based on the fact the awards lacked jurisdiction. The Court estimated that the cost for the setting aside procedure was €16,802 for each party. That decision was appealed and is currently pending in the Hague Court of Appeal; (iii) The *Kingdom of Lesotho v. Swissbourgh Diamond Mines (Pty) Ltd* award of 18 April 2016 and the subsequent cost award of 20 October 2016 were set aside by the High Court of Singapore on 14 August 2017; and (iv) The *GPF GP S.à.r.l v. Republic of Poland* (SCC Case No. V 2014/168) award on jurisdiction of 15 February 2017 was set aside by the High Court of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on 2 March 2018. No information was available on costs but the justice ruled that he trusted the parties to be able to agree on costs which, prima facie, should follow the event.
suggested that the Working Group may also wish to take note of an emerging approach based on this proportional allocation of costs (A/CN.9/930/Rev.1, para. 55).

61. While ICSID tribunals have adopted divergent approaches in the past, ICSID reported at the thirty-fourth session that costs had been allocated among parties in approximately half of the recently issued arbitral awards, and therefore that a trend in favour of departing from the traditional public international law default rule mentioned above could be identified. In the awards concerned, arbitral tribunals had ordered that the costs of the arbitration should be borne by the unsuccessful party, or costs had been apportioned between the parties (A/CN.9/930/Rev.1, para. 54).

62. The 2014 MH Study indicated that 56 per cent of tribunals required each party to bear their own costs with 10 per cent ordering fully adjusted costs and 34 per cent making a partial adjustment. The 2017 MH Study confirms a trend toward proportional allocation (or adjustment) of costs. Since the end of 2012, only 36 per cent of the tribunals required each party to bear their own costs. Seven per cent ordered the unsuccessful party to pay full costs and 57 per cent made a partially adjusted cost order. The 2017 MH Study further notes that since 2013, 61 per cent of ICSID tribunals have ordered adjusted costs in comparison to 69 per cent of the UNCITRAL tribunals.

63. The 2017 MH Study further indicates that the proportional allocation relates to both party and tribunal costs. The number of tribunals making such allocation has doubled since 2013. The study also indicates that the percentage of successful claimant investors and respondent States receiving adjusted costs order has risen respectively to 65 per cent and 63 per cent (an increase from 53 per cent and 38 per cent in the 2014 MH Study).

64. The following are some examples provided by PCA on how costs were allocated in a few cases it administered (see para. 0 above). For example, in Chemtura Corporation v. Canada in which the respondent prevailed, the claimant was ordered to bear all arbitration costs and to bear one half of the respondent’s legal costs (which constituted 73.7 per cent of the overall costs). In Dunkeld International Investment Ltd v. Belize, both parties were ordered to share tribunal and administrative costs and to bear its own legal costs. In Almas v. Poland, the claimant was ordered to bear the tribunal and administrative cost with each party bearing its own costs. There have been other instances where the parties would share tribunal and administrative costs with the claimant bearing a specific portion of the respondent’s costs and where the claimant was ordered to bear the entirety of the arbitration costs including the respondent’s costs.

65. As illustrated above, a wide range of approaches have been taken by tribunals in allocating costs and the Working Group may wish to consider different factors that might have impacted such decisions, for example, proportion of successful claims, party behaviour, complexity of the case as well as the reasonableness of the costs.

5. Comparative analysis

66. During its discussion, the Working Group noted that the cost and duration of ISDS proceedings should be examined with reference to suitable comparators. It was further mentioned the appropriate comparators should be carefully considered when assessing whether costs were in fact excessive, or durations unnecessarily long (A/CN.9/930/Rev.1, paras. 43 and 62).

67. While the following provides some basic information for that purpose, the Working Group may wish to note the difference in the structure as well as in the circumstances when disputes are settled through such mechanisms. For example, parties to ICJ and WTO cases are generally limited to States; WTO dispute resolution mechanism is based on a set of agreements concluded under the auspices of the Marrakesh Agreement; and the domestic court system usually features a two or three-tier appeal system where decisions can be appealed. With respect to costs more specifically, both ICJ and WTO dispute settlement mechanisms have been established within a system where significant portion of the overall cost is absorbed through the system with member States contributing to the organization’s budget. The same
applies to domestic courts where States are financially responsible for the operation of the courts. Taking these into consideration, the Working Group may wish to further specify what other comparators and what type of information would be useful for its deliberation of the topic (for example, very complex commercial arbitration cases).

International Court of Justice

68. Established in 1945, ICJ is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. Its role is to settle, in accordance with international law, legal disputes submitted to it by States and to give advisory opinions on legal questions referred to it by authorized United Nations organs and specialized agencies.

69. A review of the information on the ICJ website indicates that the average duration of a contentious case is two years. However, certain disputes have lasted longer. For example, the dispute between Croatia and Serbia on the application of the Genocide Convention as well as the maritime dispute between Peru and Chile took six years for a judgment on the merits. In the extreme case, the maritime delimitation and territorial questions between Qatar and Bahrain took almost ten years.

70. The overall budget of ICJ for the biennium 2016–2017 was $45.8 million and is covered by the regular budget of the United Nations. $14.2 million was allocated to cover the salary of the ICJ judges (approximately $523,253 per judge), their pensions, other expenses and allowances. For the operation of the Registry, $24.4 million was apportioned to provide legal, diplomatic, linguistic and technical support for the Court. In certain instances, the General Assembly grants a supplementary budget for specific cases which require additional resources. There is no concrete data on the average cost of ICJ contentious cases, but it is estimated that an advisory proceeding could range from $450,000 to $600,000.

71. As to costs borne by States in ICJ proceedings, there is no reliable data as no cost awards are made. This generally applies to cases at International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), WTO as well as State-to-State arbitration. Furthermore, States rarely disclose how much they spent on conducting a case. Financial assistance provided through the Secretary-General’s Trust Fund may, however, provide a glimpse. On 24 May 2004, financial assistance of $350,000 was awarded respectively to Benin and Niger to defray the expenses in connection with the submission of their boundary dispute to ICJ. On 28 January 2008, Djibouti was awarded an initial advance of $136,260 in connection with the institution of proceedings in a case concerning Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djibouti v. France).
World Trade Organization

72. WTO has a dispute settlement mechanism to address disputes arising out of its agreements.\(^{60}\) WTO indicated target durations for each stage of the process, with 60 days for consultationsconciliationmediation, 45 days for the setting up of the panel and the appointment of the panellists, 6 months for the final panel report and 3 months for circulation to WTO members. If there is no appeal, DSB is expected to adopt the panel report in 60 days, which means that the dispute would be resolved in approximately one year. If there is an appeal, the Appellate Body is expected to produce its report, not exceeding 60 to 90 days. DSB would then adopt the report of the Appellate Body within 30 days, with the dispute being resolved in approximately one year and three months.

73. Recent studies indicate that these time frames have seldom been met. For example, statistics indicate that for consultation requests submitted between 2007 and 2011, the average duration till the adoption of a total of 40 report by DSB (including 27 panel and 13 Appellate Body reports) were 28 months. They further indicate that 32 per cent of the disputes were resolved in less than 2 years with 50 per cent requiring 2 to 3 years.\(^{61}\) A more detailed analysis reveals that the average duration of consultations (from request to establishment of panel) was 6.6 months, of panel proceedings 15.1 months and of the appellate proceedings 3.3 months.\(^{62}\)

74. It is difficult to extricate from the budget of WTO the amount allocated for its dispute resolution mechanism but the 2016 budget of the WTO Appellate Body was approximately 7.5 million Swiss francs. Like ICJ, the budget of the Appellate Body is covered by contributions made by WTO members and disputing parties do not bear any costs other than their regular contributions.

75. Although private law firms participate in the preparation of the parties' written submissions to a panel or the Appellate Body, there is lack of information on the cost of such representation. States usually do not reveal how much was spent on a specific case. Moreover, some States have internalized the cost for undertaking dispute settlement within WTO, which makes it even more difficult to assess the party costs. The maximum fees that may be charged by the Advisory Centre on WTO Law provides a glimpse of relevant costs. For example, the Advisory Centre may charge 72,000 to 144,000 Swiss francs for panel proceedings and 43,000 to 85,000 Swiss francs for Appellate Body proceedings.\(^{63}\)

E. Explanations on increasing cost and duration of ISDS and policy objectives for reform

1. Reasons for lengthy and costly proceedings

76. There may be a number of explanations on why the cost and duration of ISDS proceedings have become so high and lengthy as well as on why they have increased recently. Furthermore, the explanations would vary depending on the circumstance of each case.

77. At its thirty-fourth session, the Working Group noted some elements which could contribute to the level of cost of ISDS proceedings (A/CN.9/930/Rev.1, paras. 45–47 and 65). This section attempts to categorizes and summarize such factors, which may have contributed to increased cost and duration.

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\(^{60}\) See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU, annex 2 of the WTO agreement).


\(^{63}\) Information is available at http://www.acwl.ch/ces/.
Dispute itself

78. The first category of explanations is derived from the dispute itself.

79. The fact that the majority of the claims is based on investment treaties and not on contracts may be one explanation as it entails issues of international law. The complexity of cases and the fragmented nature of investor protection provisions in a number of different investment treaties could provide another. In general, the open-ended nature of legal issues and the need to study numerous previous arbitral awards as well as other legal sources may illustrate why parties and tribunals need extra time. Complexity of cases may require extensive volume of evidence to be submitted, which may also entail translation of such material. The quality of the factual records could also impact the overall duration of the proceedings.

80. The overall cost of ISDS cases is seemingly closely linked with the amount being claimed by investors. The 2017 MH Study indicates that the mean amount claimed in investment arbitrations increased significantly to $2.37 billion (compared to $491.7 million in the 2014 Study). The median amount claimed was $196.4 million, which was an increase from $66.1 million in the 2014 Study.

81. The 2017 MH study, however, provides that despite the increase in the amount claimed and the overall costs, the average length of the proceedings increased by six months, from 3.7 years to 4.3 years. It further notes that the increase in median duration was almost negligible, from 3.6 years to 3.7 years. This may imply that the amount claimed by investors do not necessarily have an impact on the duration of the proceedings.

Behaviour of the parties and their legal counsel

82. The second category of explanations is derived from the behaviour of the parties to the dispute and/or their legal representatives.

83. For example, both claimant investors and respondent States take extensive time in preparing their case and in making their submissions. As respondents, States generally require more time to respond to ISDS claims as they may need to coordinate among a number of authorities, to engage legal counsel and experts to defend their case as well as to gather relevant evidence. The willingness to obtain best possible representation and to develop adequate defences explain delays and increased costs, though States generally go through a tender process to reduce costs. During the thirty-fourth session of the Working Group, it was emphasized that States should be given sufficient time to respond to claims (A/CN.9/930/Rev.1, para. 50). In that context, the Working Group may wish to consider the preparedness and readiness of States in responding to ISDS claims.

84. The lack of a rule of binding precedent and a consequent lack of predictability may place parties and their legal counsel under a duty to submit all available arguments, whether or not those arguments had been accepted or rejected by earlier tribunals (A/CN.9/930/Rev.1, para. 44). The fact that many legal issues remain unsettled leads parties to invest extensive resources to develop a legal position by studying numerous previous arbitral awards.

85. Parties may also be tempted to present all possible claims to the tribunal due the fact that (i) decisions are being made by the tribunal appointed for that specific dispute; and (ii) even if prior tribunals have made consistent decisions, there is the possibility that the tribunal at hand might decide otherwise. Moreover, the fact that the final award is not subject to appeal puts burden on the parties to raise all issues of fact and points of laws. For example, UNCTAD noted that large law firms, who dominate the ISDS field, tend to mobilize a team of attorneys for each case who employ expensive litigation techniques, which include intensive research on each arbitrator candidate, far-reaching

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64 If the figures for the Yukos case are excluded, the average amount claimed was $1.1 billion.
65 UNCTAD, supra note 1.
and burdensome document discovery and lengthy arguments about minutest case details.\(^{66}\)

86. Claims by shell companies, other abusive practices and inflated or unsubstantiated/frivolous claims as well as delay tactic by the parties (including the use of multiple forums leading to concurrent proceedings) may also have the potential to increase cost and duration of ISDS proceedings. The fact that the average amount claimed by ultimately successful claimants was $794 million compared to $1,539 million claimed by unsuccessful claimants indicates that flawed claims have driven up the cost of ISDS proceedings. In that context, existing mechanisms to dismiss frivolous claims and to address other abusive practices at an early stage may not be satisfactory or efficient.

**Composition of the tribunal and the conduct of proceedings**

87. The third category of explanations relate to the composition of the arbitral tribunal and the conduct of the proceedings.

88. Delays in the appointment or constitution of the tribunal would likely have a negative effect on the duration of the ISDS proceedings.\(^{67}\) It should also be noted that disclosure requirements may sometimes lead to delays. The Working Group also noted that parties needed to expend considerable sums in appointing tribunal members.

89. The fact that a small number of arbitrators are commonly appointed in a number of cases may also provide an explanation to the delays. Unavailability of the arbitrators to fully devote themselves to an ISDS case (due to multiple appointments or other engagements as counsel or experts) could be an additional reason.

90. As noted by the Working Group, how proceedings are conducted is an important element contributing to the overall length and cost of ISDS proceedings. Tribunal dynamics leading to lengthy deliberations and sometime dissenting opinions may have an impact on the time required to render an award. Ineffective case management, lack of organization and extensive hearings could all contribute to longer duration and increased costs. Limited use of procedural tools such as timetables and time limits, and illiteracy with modern technologies may result in unnecessary delays and costs.

91. The perceived reluctance by tribunals to act decisively in certain situations for fear of being challenged, or of the award being set aside or annulled, may also explain ineffective case management by the tribunals. For example, decisions on granting multiple extensions of time, on late introduction of new evidence, or on rescheduling of hearings at last minute, may be overly attentive to due process considerations or based on an excessively cautious approach.

**Systemic reasons**

92. At the thirty-fourth session, it was pointed out that the increase in costs may be related to systemic issues and the structure of the ISDS regime, or, alternatively, the lack of a system. It was added that these issues had led to a lack of consistency and, importantly for States as respondents in particular, a lack of predictability of outcome (A/CN.9/930/Rev.1, para. 46).

2. **Reform objectives**

93. When a dispute arises between an investor and a State, the objective of the parties would be to resolve the dispute in a fair and effective manner. Taking into account information provided above, the Working Group may wish to reach a shared understanding on the policy objective of ISDS reforms relating to cost and duration including whether and how to address the concerns identified. For example, it may be...
to provide a mechanism where parties are able to resolve their disputes reasonably, fairly and effectively. The need for the tribunal to render a “correct” award may also be emphasized along with the quality of the award or outcomes and ultimately enforceability (A/CN.9/930/Rev.1, paras. 59 and 71). The Working Group may also wish to confirm that adequate time should be provided to both claimant investors and respondent States to prepare for the proceedings and to arbitral tribunals to carefully consider the case and to render their award.

94. At the Working Group, it was highlighted that a distinction could be made between time and cost that were excessive and unjustified and that were necessary and justified. Yet, it was also mentioned that even justified cost and time may be a heavy burden on developing States and small- and medium-sized enterprises.

95. At the thirty-fourth session, it was stated that excess costs could be attributed in part to abusive practices, parallel proceedings, the absence of clear procedures, and the absence of an inefficient mechanisms to dismiss frivolous claims at an early stage (A/CN.9/930/Rev.1, para. 46). With regard to duration, it was noted that the appointment of the tribunal members, discovery or document production, and the issuance of awards were the most time-consuming stages leading to lengthy ISDS proceedings (A/CN.9/930/Rev.1, para. 65).

96. Lastly, the Working Group may also wish to recall comments made at the thirty-fourth session that concerns regarding cost and duration have to be examined as a whole; its constituent parts interacted in different ways, so that once the various concerns had been identified, it would be necessary to consider them from a systemic viewpoint (A/CN.9/930/Rev.1, para. 59). In that context, whether possible reforms must be addressed as a multilateral level is another question for the Working Group to consider.

F. Efforts to address cost and duration: desirability of reforms

Preliminary views expressed by States

97. Without prejudice to its future work on the topic, the Working Group has previously indicated some possible solutions to address concerns relating to cost and duration. Moreover, attention was called to the need to consider the issues in the broader context of innovations in investment treaties and in arbitration rules. In that context, this section provides a general overview of possible measures to improve the cost- and time-effectiveness of ISDS proceedings.

98. The Working Group may wish to note, however, that such efforts, which may be viewed as an indication of the desirability of or the need for reforms, have not necessarily targeted ISDS specifically and have attempted more generally to tackle inefficiencies in international arbitration. Moreover, while the need to distinguish between justified and unjustified cost and time was highlighted by the Working Group, those efforts have been undertaken without such clear distinction.

99. Current efforts to increase the efficiency of the proceedings have been made by States in the investment treaties, by arbitration institutions through the revision of their rules or other guidance material, and by tribunals with regard to case management based on the discretion provided to them. UNCITRAL also has revised its Arbitration Rules in 2010 to enhance the efficiency of arbitration under the Rules and in 2013 to incorporate the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration.

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100. At the thirty-fourth session, it was mentioned that disputing parties also had a role to play in determining the overall duration of an ISDS proceeding (A/CN.9/930/Rev.1, para. 49). It was mentioned that parties could choose to use forms of dispute settlement other than arbitration (negotiation, consultations, diplomatic efforts or mediation). Disputing parties also had the opportunity to control both duration and cost of arbitration through effective case management and their decisions, including in selecting counsel and experts, in considering their choices of arbitrators and of arbitration institutions to administer the case, in agreeing on the procedural timetable, in deciding to bifurcate proceedings, and in seeking early dismissal where possible (A/CN.9/930/Rev.1, para. 51).

Possible measures to address concerns about cost and duration

101. The following is a non-exhaustive list of possible measures to address the concerns expressed about cost and duration as well as to improve the efficiency of ISDS, for consideration by the Working Group. In particular, the Working Group may wish to take into account significant reform efforts underway by ICSID to tackle concerns regarding time and cost in ICSID arbitration (marked with an *):

(1) Address excessive burden on the parties to conduct ISDS proceedings
   - Promotion of dispute prevention policies
   - Dispute resolution using means other than arbitration such as mediation*, ombudsman facilities
   - Development of expedited procedures and/or simplified procedures for small claims
   - Use of third-party funding for claimants and explore third-party funding for States
   - Establishment of advisory centres similar to the Advisory Centre on WTO Law or funds to support parties (in particular, developing States and SMEs) similar to the Trust Fund established for the purposes of ICJ

(2) Stricter timelines to address lengthy duration
   - Introduction of specified time lines and implementation of stricter timelines for the parties as well as the tribunal to streamline the proceedings*
   - Improved means of tribunal constitution (for example, requiring the claimant to nominate its arbitrator in its initial notice of claim)
   - Time limit of 20 days for filing a disqualification motion*
   - Time limits on preliminary/jurisdictional objections and early determination by tribunals
   - Steps taken by a party after expiry of a time limit to be disregarded unless the late party establishes there were special circumstances justifying the delay. A request for extension of a time limit must be reasoned and may only be granted if made prior to expiry of the time limit*

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\[70\] ICSID, supra note 11.
• Tribunals to use best efforts to meet time limits for issuing orders, decisions and awards with a new duty to advise parties if they are unable to do so and to state when they anticipate meeting the time frame.*

• Tribunals to address document production with parties during the first session and list the relevant considerations when deciding disputes arising out of document production.*

• Awards to be rendered within 60 days after the last submission on an application for manifest lack of legal merit, 180 days after the last submission on a preliminary objection and 240 days after the last submission on all other matters.*

(3) Measures to manage costs

• Establishment of a budget at the outset of a case

• Introduction of schedule of fees, including for arbitrators

• Adoption of ceiling for overall costs

• Provide parties with enhanced, real-time information about the status of a case, including budget

(4) Improved management of the proceedings

• Consultations among the tribunal and parties regarding the organization of the proceedings including early case management conferences

• Use of procedural timetables

• Requirement of submission of statements/memorials in full detail

• Use of bifurcation including the provisions of relevant rules

• Use of modern technologies (for example, use of multimedia presentations and electronic transcripts during the hearing, videoconferencing, cloud-based document storage, data analytics and technology assisted document review)

• Tribunals to hold consultations immediately prior to hearings and in-person deliberations immediately after hearings

• Training of arbitrator on case management

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71 ICSID, Annual Report 2017, p. 37. The 2015 Queen Mary University of London and White & Case International Arbitration Survey reported that a procedural innovation to reduce the time and cost of arbitration that met with the most positive, and least negative, response from its participants was the “requirement that tribunals commit to and notify parties of a schedule for deliberations and delivery of final award”. Those interviewed for the survey said that they were “often kept in the dark about when awards would be rendered and would welcome being better informed”.


73 See Queen Mary University of London and White & Case, 2018 International Arbitration Survey: The Evolution of International Arbitration, pp. 31–33.

74 ICSID, supra note 71.

75 For example, ICC and other arbitration institutions provide training for arbitrators on case management.
(5) **Frivolous or unmeritorious claims**

- Availability of an effective early or expeditious dismissal mechanism

(6) **Rules on allocation of cost**

- Clear and definitive rules on allocation of cost with tribunals making costs orders on an interim basis to keep parties cost-conscious and being more willing to adjust costs
- In allocating costs, tribunals to consider specific factors, such as outcome, the parties' conduct, the complexity of the issues; and the reasonableness of the costs claimed as well as the use of third-party funding

(7) **Rules on security for cost for recovery**

- Clear rules on security for costs with possible suspension of the proceedings for non-compliance

(8) **Streamlining procedures for post-award remedies**

- Streamlined procedure for interpretation, revision and annulment and strict timelines for decisions on supplementary decision and rectification as well as on interpretation, revision or annulment

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76 For example, ICSID Arbitration Rule 41(5) provides a mechanism to deal in the preliminary stages of arbitration with claims that are manifestly without legal merit. Over 20 applications for such dismissal had been made, leading to the conclusion that where such an application was successful, time and costs were saved. On the other hand, where the application failed, additional time and costs clearly arose (A/CN.9/930/Rev.1, para. 58). Several arbitral institutions have included express “early dismissal” provisions in their latest rules. In August 2016, SIAC introduced Rule 26 in its Investment Arbitration Rules for the early dismissal of claims and defences manifestly without legal merit or manifestly outside the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. In January 2017, SCC introduced in Rule 39 a “summary procedure” which a Tribunal may adopt (at a party’s request) in relation to allegations of fact or law that are “manifestly unsustainable” or are “for any other reason, suitable to determination by way of summary procedure”. In October 2017, the ICC published guidance designed to provide greater clarity on the scope for “immediate dismissal of manifestly unmeritorious claims or defences” under Article 22 of the 2017 ICC Rules. Some investment treaties also contain similar procedure.

77 For example, article 22(1) of the draft Vietnam–EU Free Trade Agreement January 2016 provides that, “the Tribunal may order the claimant to post security for all or a part of the costs if there are reasonable grounds to believe that the claimant risks not being able to honour a possible decision on costs issued against the claimant”. Article 22(2) states specifically the consequences for a breach of a security for costs order with the possibility of the tribunal ordering suspension or termination of the proceedings. See generally, Christine Sim, Security for Costs in Investor-State Arbitration, Arbitration International, Vol. 33, Issue 1, pp. 427–495 available at https://doi.org/10.1093/arbint/aix014.
(9) **Others**

- Allowing counterclaims by respondent States\(^78\)
- Addressing abusive multiple/concurrent proceedings\(^79\)
- Provisions on consolidation of proceedings\(^80\)

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\(^78\) It is quite common in ISDS for the respondent State to include in its defence to treaty claims one or more criticisms of the investor’s underlying conduct. Yet while such arguments feature prominently in State defences, they are rarely framed as counterclaims seeking affirmative relief. The reason may lie in an instinctive preference by States to pursue any affirmative claims in their own courts. But it may also lie in perceived limits to the jurisdiction of international tribunals to hear State counterclaims. Provisions permitting counterclaims are being provided for in recent investment treaties. Certain arbitration rules, such as Rule 40 of the ICSID Arbitration Rules on ancillary claims, also provided for such a possibility. While allowing respondent States to raise counterclaims may eventually lead to a quicker resolution of all relevant disputes, the fact that the tribunal would need to consider those counterclaims in its proceeding may also lead to increased cost and duration. See Jean E. Kalicki, Counterclaims by States in Investment Arbitration, available at [https://www.iisd.org/itn/2013/01/14/counterclaims-by-states-in-investment-arbitration-2/](https://www.iisd.org/itn/2013/01/14/counterclaims-by-states-in-investment-arbitration-2/). See also two recent ICSID decisions on the issue of jurisdiction over State counterclaims: Spyridon Roussalis v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/1 (available at [https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/cases/casedetail.aspx?CaseNo=ARB/06/1](https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/cases/casedetail.aspx?CaseNo=ARB/06/1)) and Antoine Goetz and others v. Republic of Burundi, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/2 (available at [https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/cases/casedetail.aspx?CaseNo=ARB/01/2](https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/cases/casedetail.aspx?CaseNo=ARB/01/2)).

\(^79\) Treaty provisions on prohibiting abuse of process could provide the necessary mechanisms to allow arbitral tribunals to dismiss abusive claims and thus encourage investors to agree on a single forum for the resolution of their claims. See Hanno Wehland, “The Regulation of Parallel Proceedings in Investor-State Disputes”, ICSID Review Vol. 31, Issue 3 (October 2016).

\(^80\) Provisions on consolidation are also increasingly found in investment treaties (see A/CN.9/881, paras. 32–34). The guidance provided to arbitral tribunals in certain investment treaties is that the tribunal must rule in the interest of fair and efficient resolution of the claims when considering whether to consolidate. Consolidation may also be carried out under applicable institutional arbitration rules. However, it is usually not possible to consolidate proceedings which have started under different arbitration rules and/or administered by different arbitration institutions.